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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEED, 
through its administratrix 
MARY KAZAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 890426 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
New Escalante Irrigation Company, Defendant/Respondent, 
agrees that this Court has jurisdiction and agrees with the 
Plaintiff/Appellantfs Statement as to the basis therefor. 
Defendant Irrigation Company has historically diverted water 
from the Escalante River and delivered the water to the lands of 
its shareholders through open canals. The shareholders have 
applied the water to the irrigation of their lands by flood type 
irrigation. Some of the said lands drain toward the Escalante 
River; other lands drain toward an adjacent natural wash known as 
Alvey Wash. In 1983 the open canals and ditches were changed to 
a pressurized irrigation system, which more efficiently uses the 
water. Plaintiff Steed Estate asserted that Plaintiff had a 
vested right to receive the same level of return flow to Alvey 
Wash and sought an injunction, a replacement order and money 
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damages. After a trial, the court ruled against Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff filed this appeal. 
PARTIES 
The correct name of the Defendant/Respondent is "New Escal-
ante Irrigation Company" — not "The New Escalante Water 
Company", as it appears on Appellant/Plaintiff's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant Irrigation Company does not agree with the Plain-
tiff Estatefs Statement of Issues. Defendant's water rights are 
all from the Escalante River. The Plaintifffs rights are all 
from Alvey Wash, which is in an adjacent water shed. There is no 
natural connection between the Alvey Wash and the Escalante River 
above Plaintiff's point of diversion. The only way the Plaintiff 
can get Escalante River water for Plaintiff's land is for the 
Defendant to divert water from the Escalante River under the 
Defendant's rights; for the Defendant to convey that water 
through its system to the lands of its stockholders and the 
stockholders to apply the water to lands, some of which drain 
toward the Alvey Wash. The Plaintiff Estate is not a lower user 
of water from the Escalante River. The primary issue is whether 
or not under this fact situation the Plaintiff, either by appro-
priation, or under the doctrine of adverse use, or otherwise, has 
obtained a vested right to require Defendant to maintain the same 
historic level of irrigation run-off to Alvey Wash. 
The issue as to whether there is excess water, and the issue 
as to whether excess lands are being irrigated, are collateral 
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issues which are more specifically identified in the Summary of 
Argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Alvey Wash is a natural water s-hed with a drainage area of 
some 102 square miles (Tr. 347) . It empties into the Escalante 
River some 25 miles from the irrigated lands of the Plaintiff and 
Defendant here involved (Tr. 134) , but the Escalante River does 
not naturally contribute any water to Alvey Wash (Tr. 133). Some 
of the lands irrigated under Defendant's water system drain 
toward Alvey Wash and the waste water commingles with the natural 
flows in Alvey Wash. That waste water is subject to 
reappropriation under Utah law. However, it is settled law in 
Utah and elsewhere that such waste water claimant does not 
acquire, by virtue of such reappropriation, or by virtue of long 
use, any right as against the original appropriator, to require 
the run-off water to be maintained at its historic level. This 
is in contrast with the diversion of water from a stream and the 
application of that water to the irrigation of lands from which 
the return flow is to the stream from which it was initially 
diverted. Under that condition, such return flow, from the 
standpoint of the rights of use, is a part of the water supply of 
that stream. The rights of those who hold downstream 
appropriative rights in that stream attach thereto. Thus, the 
return flow is not subject to reappropriation. 
This distinction is clearly made by the Utah cases and by 
well respected writers frequently cited as authority by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
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Plaintiff claims that through the change to a sprinkler 
system, excess water has been created. This is contrary to the 
undisputed evidence. All of the water that Defendant Irrigation 
Company has the right to divert in the Escalante River is applied 
during each irrigation season to its shareholders1 lands. Even 
with the benefit of storage and the new $2 million sprinkler 
system, Defendant generally runs out of water during the late 
Summer. The trial court expressly found that there is no excess 
water. Plaintiff Estate ignores both the testimony and the 
findings on its claim of excess water. 
Plaintiff also contends that over time there has been an 
improper expansion of acreage by Defendant. Plaintiff does not 
advise the Court t-hat the Defendant has filed and perfected new 
applications to appropriate. Defendant's total perfected rights 
at the time of the trial permit its shareholders to irrigate 
2,712.28 acres. The trial court so found, and the evidence will 
demonstrate that at the time of the trial the Defendant's 
shareholders were irrigating less than 2,700 acres. 
Finally, it is Defendant's position that no change applica-
tion is required, either to change from one tract of land to 
another within the Defendant's irrigation system, or to change 
from a direct flow application of the water to a sprinkler 
system. 
CITATION TO RECORD 
We will refer to the pleadings, pre-trial order, etc. as the 
Record (R.) and to the evidence which has been transcribed in two 
volumes as the Transcript (Tr.) We mention this, because the 
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Appellant/Plaintiff's brief has apparently assumed that the 
transcript would be renumbered in succession starting with the 
end of the Record. The Transcript, as sent to the Respondent/De-
fendant has not been so re-numbered, and in the discussion to 
follow we will refer to the Transcript page number which appears 
in the upper right-hand corner of each page. It probably will 
need to be further numbered to conform to the citations used by 
Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF ESTATE IS NOT A LOWER USER FROM THE 
ESCALANTE RIVER. ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S WATER COMES 
FROM ALVEY WASH. 
It should be noted at the outset that the Utah State 
Engineer filed a proceeding in the District Court initiating a 
general adjudication proceeding. In that proceeding the State 
Engineer proposed a decree, and the court under date of July 27, 
1977, approved the uncontested rights, as set forth in that 
Proposed Determination (R. 93, & Ex. 7). The trial court here 
so found (Finding No. 5, R. 325). 
Plaintiff Estate's water rights are "strictly out of" Alvey 
Wash (Tr. 32) . Alvey Wash has a drainage area of 102 square 
miles (Tr. 396). Its drainage area is shown in dark blue on a 
topographic map (Ex. 103) . It is frequently a dry wash in its 
upper part (Tr. 152) . There is a fairly substantial discharge 
of water from Alvey Wash, but it is erratic (Tr. 397,398,541). 
Part of the land irrigated by Defendant Irrigation Company's 
shareholders naturally drains back to the Escalante River, and 
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part of it drains toward Alvey Wash (Tr. 445) . However, there 
is no natural connection between the Escalante River and Alvey 
Wash above Plaintiff's land. 
Mr. Scott Steed, who operates the Plaintiff Estate's farm, 
was asked (Tr. 133) : 
Q. Is there anything other than the company's system 
where you can get water from the Escalante River into 
the Alvey Wash except through the water system, open 
canal or pipeline? 
A. To my knowledge, no. 
Q. Well they are not physically connected that high are 
they? 
A. No. There is not a physical connection between the 
two. 
Dr. Allen, Plaintiff's expert, agreed (Tr. 359-60) . There 
is no evidence to the contrary. 
In this regard, the trial court found (Finding 15, R. 326): 
15. There is no natural contribution of water to 
Alvey Wash from the Escalante River. The only Escalante 
River water which reaches Alvey Wash above the plaintiff's 
point of diversion, or otherwise, is the runoff and seepage 
water from diversions of water by the defendant from the 
Escalante River and the conveyance of said water through 
its system to irrigate the lands of its shareholders. Part 
of this water reaches Alvey Wash as run-off and seepage 
water from the said irrigation. 
We thus submit that Plaintiff Estate is not a lower user of 
water from the Escalante River from which Defendant's water is 
diverted. We will demonstrate in our discussion of the applica-
ble law that under these facts the Plaintiff acquired no right, 
either by appropriation, by adverse use, or otherwise, to compel 
Defendant Irrigation Company, or its shareholders, to continue 
to let the same amount of waste water run off their lands into 
Alvey Wash. 
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POINT II• NO EXCESS WATER HAS RESULTED FROM THE CONVERSION 
FROM A FLOOD TYPE IRRIGATION SYSTEM TO THE 
SPRINKLER SYSTEM. 
Plaintiff Estate asserts that the change to a sprinkler 
system has resulted in substantial amounts of excess water, and 
argues that in equity the excess water should be shared with it. 
Both the evidence and the trial court's findings are to the 
contrary. 
The evidence is to the effect that a sprinkler system is 
approximately 25% more efficient than flood type irrigation 
(Tr. 430). Engineer Fred Duberow testified that the sprinkler 
system does not make water (Tr. 434) , but because of the more 
efficient application of the water, the crops consume more. 
With flood-type irrigation the plants at the upper end are 
over-watered, and the lower areas are under-watered (Tr. 434). 
Barry Barnson, President of Defendant Irrigation Company, 
testified that the pipe capacity is 33 c.f.s. and Defendant's 
1919 Hayes Decree right, with an 1875 priority, is for 40 c.f.s. 
The difference is now stored (Tr. 520); the company doesn't have 
water left at the end of the season — "we use it all" 
(Tr. 520) . Normally the natural river flow in June and July 
will not fill the pipeline (Tr. 521). To pressurize the pipe-
line the Defendant Irrigation Company releases water from its 
reservoirs and normally must add about 16 c.f.s. from storage in 
order to augment the river flows and fill the pipeline (Tr. 
521) . The company usually reaches a point each season when it 
cannot do that. There is then a reduction made in the amount of 
water used. This is accomplished by reducing the number of 
8 
nozzles (Tr. 521). On the day of the trial (June 15, 1989) the 
pipeline system was totally off, because of lack of water (Tr. 
158 & 522). The reservoirs were dry. The small amount of water 
in the8 stream was being diverted into storage to build up the 
water supply. In five to ten days, with a 50% reduction in 
nozzles, there would be enough stored water accumulated so that 
the system could be reactivated for a few days (Tr. 522) . The 
pipeline cost a little over $2 million (Tr. 523). 
McKay Bailey was the current water master, and he had used 
water from Defendant Irrigation Company's system for 20 years. 
He testified that in 1983 and 1984 there was plenty of water, 
but at times the water supply was so low that the company gave 
it all to the Town of Escalante to save the Town gardens (Tr. 
528). He also testified that two years ago the company ran out 
of water in October, or the middle of September, and the water 
was totally off for ten days, and then after a few days of 
storage it came back on for a short time (Tr. 527). 
Doyle Cottam had been the president of Defendant Irrigation 
Company for 20 years. His testimony concerning the operation 
was the same as Mr. Barnson's (Tr. 529 & 530). Many years while 
he was president the company ran out of water and gave what was 
available to the Town (Tr. 530). Many years the supply was down 
to 7 c.f.s., and some years down to 4 c.f.s. (Tr. 530). The 
Defendant tries to maintain a tight earthen dam and to divert 
all of the water available in the Escalante River at the compa-
ny's point of diversion (Tr. 534). 
The trial court found (Finding 21, R. 331), as follows: 
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. . .The original canal had a capacity of 40 c.f.s. The 
sprinkling system has a capacity of 33 c.f.s. The balance 
of the 40 c.f.s. of water is stored for use later in the 
season, together with any water covered by subsequent 
applications, as set forth above. Every season since the 
sprinkling system was installed the defendant shareholders 
have utilized all of the water available to the defendant 
company under all of its rights, but they have applied less 
water in the Spring and more water has been utilized from 
the river and the reservoirs during the Summer season. The 
water available to the defendant company in the late Fall 
is generally inadequate to meet the needs of the sharehold-
ers to irrigate their lands and water use is curtailed. 
Available direct flow water is then diverted into the 
reservoirs and any available storage water is commingled 
therewith and the combined water is distributed in turns 
with some periods of total non-use. There is and has been 
no excess water resulting from the sprinkling system, but 
the sprinkling system has permitted the available water to 
be applied to the land more efficiently. The use of the 
sprinkling system is approximately 25% more efficient than 
flood-type irrigation and has provided more late season 
water for the decreed lands. The sprinkling system was 
constructed at a cost of more than $2,000,000. (Emphasis 
added.) 
POINT III. DEFENDANT IRRIGATION COMPANY HAS NOT IMPROPERLY 
ENLARGED ITS ACREAGE. 
Plaintiff Estate argues that there has been an unauthorized 
expansion of acreage in the magnitude of 700 acres (Plaintiff's 
brief, pages 18 & 19) and then reasons that this expansion 
occurred because of the sprinkler system. Neither the evidence, 
nor the trial court's findings, support that reasoning. At page 
19 of its brief Plaintiff notes that Defendant Irrigation 
Company was irrigating only 2,118 acres in 1952. However, 
Plaintiff neglects to tell this Court that after 1952 the 
Defendant filed and perfected new applications to appropriate 
water from the Escalante River, and at the time of the trial had 
the right to irrigate 2,712.28 acres. 
One is Application to Appropriate No. 26833, Certificate 
No. 6025. It permits the diversion of water from the Escalante 
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River for storage in Wide Hollow Reservoir for the irrigation of 
2,352.98 acres of land. Said right has a priority of April 8, 
1955, and is covered by Water User Claim 66. It is set forth in 
the State Engineer's court-approved Proposed Determination at 
page 181. The underlying documents for that Water User Claim 
were introduced as Exhibit 109 (Tr. 456). 
Another application filed after 1952 was Application to 
Appropriate No. 33941. It also permits diversion of water from 
the Escalante River and storage in the Wide Hollow Reservoir. 
That application was approved on June 29, 1962. Defendant 
Irrigation Company elected to file Water User Claim No. 88 in 
the pending general adjudication suit, in lieu of filing proof 
of appropriation, pursuant to Section 73-3-16, Utah Code Anno. 
1953, as amended. See Appendix A hereto. Water User Claim 88, 
in combination with the Defendant's other rights, provides for 
the irrigation of 2,712.18 acres of land, part of which is 
irrigated with supplemental water from other sources owned by 
various shareholders. W. U. Claim 88 and the underlying 
documents were introduced in evidence as Exhibit 110. See 
Appendix B hereto. 
Harold Donaldson, who worked for the State Engineer's 
Office for 37 years (Tr. 457) and was in charge of the prepara-
tion of the Proposed Determination which was adopted by the 
court in 1977 (Tr. 458-62) testified that the water under the 
Proposed Determination for use by the Defendant Irrigation 
Company is for 2,712.28 acres (Tr. 463). The underlying water 
rights, change applications, etc., for the other rights of the 
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Defendant are in evidence as Exhibit 108 for W. U. Claim No. 21 
and Exhibit 111 for W. U. Claim 1200 (Tr. 456-7). 
The 1875 decreed right and the perfected applications since 
then (which include the two discussed next above) , and 
Application 11155, which was filed in 1939, permit the Defendant 
to irrigate 2,712.28 acres. The trial court expressly so found 
in Finding No. 16(d) (Tr. 327). Finding No. 16 on Defendant's 
water rights is as follows: 
16. The lands historically irrigated by the share-
holders of defendant from its diversions from the Escalante 
River partly drain into the Escalante River and partly 
drain into Alvey Wash. The lands irrigated through the 
defendant's system, which drain toward Alvey Wash, contrib-
ute run-off and seepage water to the natural flow of Alvey 
Wash. Natural surface run-off in Alvey Wash is sporadic. 
Flash floods periodically occur and produce large quanti-
ties of water, but the flood waters are laden with silt and 
only the waters available during the tail-end of the flood 
are suitable for and are used by plaintiff for irrigation. 
Alvey Wash is a gaining stream and those who use water from 
it generally maintain an earth-type dam completely across 
the wash. Defendant's water rights are as follows: 
(a) Defendant was awarded the right to use 40 
c.f.s. of water from the Escalante River for irriga-
tion by a decree entered by the Sixth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, in and for the County of Garfield, on the 
25th day of June, 1919. That decreed water has a 
priority of 1875 and the water was initially used by 
direct flow diversion and was applied to the land by 
flood-type irrigation. The Hayes decreed right is 
covered by Water User (W.U.) Claim 1200. Two change 
applications have been filed thereon — and both were 
approved. One is Change Application a-1894. The 
other change application is a-5317. It was filed on 
September 26, 1967. Under that change defendant was 
permitted to store the said water in its reservoir now 
known as the Wide Hollow Reservoir. 
(b) Defendant also filed Application to Appropri-
ate No. 11155, which was amended by Change Application 
a-2829 and certificated under Certificate No. 5003. 
Said application has a priority date of June 14, 1939. 
The water therefor is diverted from the North Fork of 
the Escalante River and the approved application 
provides for storage in the North Creek Reservoir of 
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1,165.58 acre-feet of water. The water is also used 
for irrigation. Said right is covered by W.U. Claim 
21 in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination at 
page 164. 
(c) Defendant also filed Application to Appropri-
ate 26833, which is certificated under Certificate 
6025, which permits the diversion of water from the 
Escalante River and the storage of that water in Wide 
Hollow Reservoir for the irrigation of 2,352.98 acres 
of land. Said right has a priority of April 8, 1955, 
and is covered by W.U. Claim 66 in the State Engi-
neer's Proposed Determination at page 181. 
(d) Defendant also filed Application to Appropri-
ate 33941 for the diversion of water from the Escal-
ante River and storage in the Wide Hollow Reservoir. 
Said application was approved on June 29, 1962. 
Defendant elected to file W.U. Claim 88 in the pending 
general adjudication suit, pursuant to Section 
73-3-16, Utah Code Anno. 1953, as amended. W.U. Claim 
88 was duly filed and in combination with the other 
rights of the defendant provides for the irrigation of 
2,712.28 acres of land, part of which is irrigated 
with supplemental water from other sources owned by 
various shareholders. (Emphasis added) 
At the time of the trial Defendant Irrigation Company was 
supplying water for less than 2,700 acres. 
Plaintiff Estate had Mr. Steed make an acreage computation, 
using an aerial photograph. He was asked (Tr. Ill) how many 
acres the Defendant's shareholders were cultivating in 1976 and 
he answered "about 1,825". He then testified that in 1987 he 
calculated the acreage as 2,600 acres, plus a few small pieces 
added since 1987. He testified (Tr. 113) that for the years 
1985 and 1986 the average was between 2,530 and 2,600 acres. 
Mr. Duberow, an engineer called by Defendant, testified of 
an acreage study he made in 1987. He used a 1984 aerial 
photograph and then went to the land and noted any new lands. 
The aerial photograph is in evidence as Exhibit 105. He 
testified how he computed the acreage, starting at Tr. 414. 
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Exhibit 107 is his computation sheet (Tr. 421) . He used a 
standard method to compute the acreage and concluded that the 
total acreage being irrigated as of April 1987 was 2,778 acres. 
(Tr. 422-424) . 
Mr. Donaldson, who prepared the Proposed Determination, 
testified that just before the 1989 trial he took the 11 
official maps showing the Defendant Irrigation Company's 
irrigated land when the official survey was made. He had helped 
prepare those maps (Tr. 458) . He went on the ground and 
compared the land being irrigated about a month before the trial 
(Tr. 463) . He plotted the changes on the official hydographic 
survey maps. He listed the changes on Exhibit 113 (Tr. 466). 
He concluded that Defendant's irrigated acreage one month before 
the trial was 2,650 acres, but that this did not include some of 
the Plaintiff Estate's land which was only partly irrigated with 
Defendant Irrigation Company stock (Tr. 483). He testified that 
Plaintiff was irrigating 148 acres (Tr. 483) ; that 60 acres of 
this was irrigated with Alvey Wash water rights; and that the 
88-acre balance was irrigated from wells and with stock owned or 
rented in Defendant Irrigation Company. Without knowing how 
many shares Plaintiff Estate was using, he said he could not say 
what part of the 88 acres should be added to the 2,650 acres 
(Tr. 483). However, Mr. Scott Steed provided those figures. He 
testified (Tr. 87) about the stock he had purchased and rented. 
He testified that in 1988 he watered approximately 30 acres with 
stock and said "we barely made 30 acres" and this year 1989, it 
looks like maybe 15 acres (Tr. 89). Thus, at the time Mr. 
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Donaldson made his study, Plaintiff was irrigating with company 
stock between 15 and 30 acres. When this is added to the 2,650 
that Donaldson identified, it would bring the total irrigated 
acreage up to 2,680. These three witnesses are the only ones 
who testified on Defendant's irrigated acreage. 
We now turn to the applicable law. 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO FORCE 
DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN THE SAME LEVEL OF RUN-OFF, 
OR TO PREVENT DEFENDANT'S SHAREHOLDERS FROM 
CHANGING TO A MORE EFFICIENT METHOD OF APPLYING 
ITS OWN IRRIGATION WATER TO THEIR LANDS. 
The three Utah cases relied on by Plaintiff Estate all 
involved lower users on the same stream. The historic return 
flow, which was at issue in those cases, was to the same water 
source from which the upstream appropriaror had diverted his 
water. None involved situations such as we have here where the 
run-off water is to a different natural water channel. 
This is a critical distinction. It is the distinction made 
by the Court in East Bench Irr. Co. et al. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 
et al., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954). There upstream 
appropriators had filed a change application to change their 
points of diversion so that water could be diverted into storage. 
At page 180 of the Utah Reports the Court in East Bench cited 
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. vs. Union Central Life 
Insurance Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943), and 113 
Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 238 
*Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 5 Utah 2d 53, 296 
P.2d 723 (1956); East Bench Irr. Co., et al. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 
et al. , 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); and Piute Reservoir 
Irr. Co., Deseret Irr. Co., et al. v. West Panguitch Irr. & 
Reservoir Co., 12 Utah 2d 168, 364 P.2d 113 (1961) 
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P.2d 418 (1951); and McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 
570 (1952) , and said that the upstream irrigator in East Bench 
was contending that those cases should control -- and that under 
those cases the upstream irrigator had the right to completely 
consume all of the water which it diverts by using it over and 
over again. 
The Court in East Bench distinguished those cases by noting 
that they did not involve the rights of upper and lower water 
users on the same natural stream. Said the court: 
.There [where the waste water did not return to the 
stream from which it was diverted] the waters in question 
were originally diverted by an upper canal company and 
reached the lower users1 lands only through that means after 
they had been abandoned but before they had reached the 
stream from which they were originally diverted. It is 
generally recognized that such lower user, even though he 
may by appropriation acquire the right to use such waters as 
reach his lands from such source, either directly from the 
higher lands or through a natural water channel, can acquire 
no right to have the upper user divert and bring such water 
onto the upper user's land from where it will become avail-
able for the irrigation of the lower user's land before it 
reaches the stream from which it was originally diverted. 
The upper user in such case owed the lower user no obligat-
ion to bring such water to him; he could abandon the diver-
sion from the stream altogether and thereby deprive the 
lower user of all of such waste or surplus water. Under 
such conditions the lower user can acquire no vested right 
against the upper user who first diverted the water from the 
natural stream and brought it to him either by appropria-
tion, adverse user, estoppel, acquiescence or other means, 
to compel him to continue such practice.* But a lower user 
of the water of a natural stream, as we have seen, acquires 
a vested right as against all upper users that they shall 
not increase the amount of water consumed after he makes his 
appropriation by a change of place of diversion or place or 
manner of use and thereby deprive him of the use of such 
water, (emphasis added) 
At this point, in Footnote 6, the Court cited and quoted 
with approval from Hutchins ff. . .The Law of Water Rights. . ." 
362-368; where this same distinction is made, as follows: 
16 
Appropriations may generally be made of waste water which 
has been abandoned by the original appropriators, but with 
important qualifications. Generally, an independent right 
to the use of abandoned or waste water can be acquired only 
if the water has not yet returned to the stream from which 
it was diverted. If such water after abandonment has 
re-entered a portion of the stream system from which it was 
originally appropriated, as noted in greater detail below, 
it becomes a part of that watercourse in legal contemplation 
as well as physically, and from the standpoint of rights of 
use, it is just as much a part of the flow as is the water 
with which it is mingled; hence appropriative rights which 
before the mingling have attached to the waters of the 
stream attach with equal effect to the waste waters orig-
inally diverted from the stream and then abandoned into it, 
so that an independent appropriation cannot then be made of 
the waste waters as such. . . . (emphasis added) 
Hutchins, then after noting that where the waste water goes to 
another channel it is open to reappropriation, said: 
11
. . . These waste-water appropriations, however, are not 
vested with all the attributes of a true appropriative 
right, for it appears to be settled that the waste-water 
claimant does not thereby acquire, solely by virtue of such 
appropriation, a vested right as against the original 
appropriator to have the practice of wasting water for his 
particular benefit continue. . . . " (emphasis added) 
Numerous cases from many western states are cited by 
Hutchins, including the Utah case of Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 
260, 125 P. 867 (1912) . 
In the Garns v. Rollins, case the owner of land had 
collected into a pond water from a large number of streams and 
from springs, seepage and percolation and from an artesian well 
sunk on his land. The water was conveyed from the pond by an 
"artificial water course" and used to irrigate 36 acres of land. 
The waste, or run-off, water had been used by another for nine 
years and he asserted the right to continue to receive the water. 
The court held that while artificial flow claimants may have 
priorities among themselves, they have no right to require the 
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original appropriator to continue to divert water from the 
natural supply and maintain the historic flow. Said the Court: 
The law is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree, 
that one landowner receiving waste water which flows, seeps, 
or percolates from the land of another cannot acquire a 
prescriptive right to such water, nor any right (except by 
grant) to have the owner of the land from which he obtains 
the water continue the flow. . . . 
The Court then (page 272) quoted with approval from 1 Weil 
Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed.) at page 50: 
While artificial flow claimants may thus have priorities 
between themselves, they can have no right of continuance 
against the owner of the natural supply (the appropriator on 
the natural stream. . . ) , except by grant, condemnation, or 
dedication (or by the rule of compulsory service where the 
water is distributed to public use). The chief instance of 
artificial flows in practice is where some stream owner has 
carried water to a distance and, after use, discharges it 
below his land or works. . . .Seeing the water come down, 
other parties arrive, build ditches below, receive the water 
and put it to use. Yet unless they have a contract with the 
stream owner, they must generally rely upon continued 
receipt from him of such water at their peril. In such case 
the creator of this artificial flow may cease to allow it to 
escape. 
The Court (at 41 Utah 273) also quoted with approval from 
pages 52 and 54 of Weil, as follows: 
In the absence of contract, the natural water right owner 
may cease the abandonment of waste from a ditch, and so use 
the water that none of it thereafter runs waste, or so that 
it runs off in a new place where people below no longer can 
get it. Long receipt by them of the water of itself gives 
no permanent right to have the discharge continued, whether 
by appropriation, prescription, or estoppel, even though the 
lower claimants built expensive ditches or flumes to catch 
the waste. 
Waste water soaking from the land of another after irriga-
tion need not be continued, and may be intercepted and taken 
by such original appropriator, and conducted elsewhere, 
though parties theretofore using the waste are deprived 
thereof. 
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Plaintiff Estate here asserts that Weil and Hutchins are 
"old" authorities, but the Utah Supreme Court cited these very 
quotes from Weil in Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co, v. Union 
Central Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, at p. 471 in 1943; and Hutchins 
is cited in 1952 in McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 
570. There is an unbroken line of cases since the 1912 Garns v. 
Rollins decision to the same effect, and the rule is cited as 
settled law. 
In Stookey v. Green, 53 Utah 311, 178 P. 586 (1919), the 
Court interpreted its holding in Garns v. Rollins to be that l!. 
. .the run-off, waste and seepage from irrigation are not subject 
to appropriation as against the owner of the land irrigated who 
desires to recapture it and apply it on his own land". 
In Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. 
Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943), and on rehearing 
113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), the ownership of waste water 
was elaborately discussed. The court was again dealing with 
excess water running off irrigated land and not returned to the 
source from which it was diverted. The court again held that the 
person reappropriating these waste waters "can acquire no right 
under which he can prevent the upper user from making use of such 
water or compel the upper user or appropriator to let such water 
continue to flow down to him." (page 4 72) 
Justice Wade, in a concurring opinion at pages 482-483 
expressly stated that: 
. It is well established, both in this state and in 
other western states, in the absence of a statute to the 
contrary, that the original appropriator may change its 
manner of use, or use the water over and over again, as long 
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as it does so in good faith, and such water does not escape 
from its property and control, . . • (emphasis added) 
This, said Justice Wade, is true, even though in the past such 
water has been allowed to flow onto the property of another who 
has there put it to beneficial use, and such change in use by the 
original appropriator has interfered therewith. 
On rehearing, the Court stated: 
. . .It is well established under the authorities cited in 
our previous opinion that waters diverted from a natural 
source, applied to irrigation and recapture before they 
escape from the original appropriatorfs control, still 
belong to the original appropriator. If the original 
appropriator has a beneficial use for such waters, he may 
again reuse them and no one can acquire a right superior to 
that of the original appropriator. 
We next note the case of McNaughton et ux v. Eaton et al., 
121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952). In McNaughton there was a 
natural wash adjacent to irrigated land. Some water accumulated 
therein from natural sources. Sometimes excess water (excess to 
the needs of the shareholders) was diverted by the canal company 
from other sources under its rights, and this excess water was 
released directly into the natural wash. Also, waste water which 
had theretofore been used to irrigate lands on both sides of the 
wash drained into the wash above plaintiff's diversion. The 
court squarely held that all three of these water sources (the 
natural flows, the excess water and the waste water) were subject 
to reappropriation from the wash, again citing, with approval, 
the above discussion by Hutchins. The court then squarely held 
that the reappropriator acquired no right as against the original 
appropriator to have the waste water continue to escape to the 
wash. Said the court: 
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. . . But the reappropriator of such waters cannot require 
that the first appropriator shall continue to waste such 
waters, so that they will be available for use by the 
reappropriator. The original appropriator, as long as he 
has possession or control thereof, may sell or transfer the 
right to the use of such waters to someone other than the 
reappropriator as long as he does so in good faith and they 
are beneficially used, or he may recapture and use them for 
further beneficial use if he does so before they get beyond 
his property and control. (Emphasis added) 
The issue was also presented in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 13 
Utah 2d. 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), where the court said at page 
50: 
.the waters produced in these drains are not waste 
waters as referred to in the usual sense, nor did the trial 
court find them to be such. It did find that they resulted 
both from the irrigation of the defendant's higher ground 
and from the underlying water table. We are quite in 
harmony with the idea that water rights could not be ac-
quired in waste water so that the defendant would be obliged 
to continue to irrigate his higher ground to provide water 
to be collected in the plaintiffs1 drains. . . . (Emphasis 
added) 
During this same time frame this Court decided the three 
Utah cases relied on by the Plaintiff, in which the return flow 
was to the stream from which it had been originally diverted, 
where the protestants were lower users of water from the same 
stream. In East Bench the original appropriator cited the cases 
noted above and argued that under those cases the original 
appropriator had the right to utilize all of the water and had no 
duty to return any of the water to the stream. It was in this 
context that the Court made the distinction set forth above, 
recognizing that the return flow should be returned to the stream 
Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Linke, supra; 
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., supra; 
Piute Reservoir Irr. Co. Deseret Irr. Co. v. West 
Panguitch Irr. & Reservoir Co., supra. 
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from which it was appropriated, if this is practical. If it does 
return to the stream, it is not subject to reappropriation, but 
in legal contemplation is a part of the stream, and the rights of 
the downstream appropriators attach thereto. This is then 
contrasted by this Court with a case like the present case, where 
the water is diverted from a river, transported artificially by a 
canal system, and after use for irrigation, the waste water is 
permitted to escape to an adjacent natural water course. Under 
these facts, said the Court, the waste water is subject to 
limited reappropriation. The East Bench case was decided in 
1954. The Piute Reservoir case was decided in 1951. McNaughton 
v. Eaton, supra was decided in 1952. It was in the McNaughton 
case that this Court squarely held that the water was subject to 
reappropriation, but the appropriation could not require the 
original appropriator to maintain the flows. The Court, in East 
Bench cited McNaughton v. Eaton on reappropriation, but held in 
that such an appropriative right to the waste water is a limited 
one. While those claiming the right to use this artificial flow 
may have priorities, as among themselves, they can have no right 
to continuance of the flow as against the owner who originally 
diverted the water from the natural supply and brought it to 
their lands by its canal system. This Court, in East Bench, 
cited cases from numerous western states and then quoted 
extensively from Hutchins, as noted above. The clear holding of 
ther court was that the reappropriator could not, by reason of 
his appropriation, nor by adverse use, nor by long usage, or 
otherwise, obtain a vested right against the original 
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appropriator requiring him to continue to permit the same 
quantity of water to flow off his land into the adjacent natural 
water course, and that the right to receive the same level of 
return flow is extended only to lower users of water from the 
same source. As noted, both Weil and Hutchins make this same 
distinction. The statement by Weil to that effect is quoted by 
this Court with approval in Garns v. Rollins, supra, and is cited 
again with approval in Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union 
Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, at page 472. The clear-cut 
statement to this effect by Hutchins is set forth in detail in 
the East Bench case, and is noted in McNaughton v. Eaton, supra. 
Thus, this has been the established law in the State since 
1912, and it is a rule applied by most of the western states. It 
is a distinction that makes sense. If an upper appropriator does 
not divert his entitlement, it stays in the river and is 
naturally available in order of priority to the lower users. 
There should be no rule of law that would require the 
appropriator to artificially divert that water from the Escalante 
River, to artificially convey that water through its irrigation 
system, and to apply that water to the irrigation of land in a 
way which will cause waste water to flow off of the land, so as 
to maintain the same level of waste. 
As noted next below, it has long been the policy of western 
water law to encourage the efficient use of water, but there 
would be no incentive to do so if the water saved could not be 
used by the original appropriator, who constructed the more 
efficient facilities. 
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POINT V. STATE WATER POLICY. 
This Court has frequently stated that it is the water policy 
of the State of Utah to encourage the efficient use of water. 
See American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 
188 (1951); United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434 
(1924); and Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 
289 P. 116 (1930) . The rule that the Plaintiff Estate asks this 
court to adopt would discourage conservation. The Defendant 
Irrigation Company has spent more than $2 million for a 
sprinkling system. A sprinkler system is more efficient. If the 
water conserved could not be used by those who make the expendi-
ture, because they are required by the courts to continue to 
waste water at the same level as in the past, there would be no 
reason to expend the money to make more efficient use. 
POINT VI. THE DEFENDANT FILED AND SECURED APPROVAL OF CHANGE 
APPLICATIONS TO STORE ITS DIRECT FLOW DIVERSION 
RIGHTS IN THE NORTH CREEK AND WIDE HOLLOW 
RESERVOIRS. 
In each of the three Utah cases cited by Plaintiff, the 
applicant proposed to construct a dam and to divert its direct 
flow water rights into storage. Change applications were neces-
sary in all three cases because in each of the cases the dam 
which was to be constructed required a different point of diver-
sion. In one of the cases there were also proposed changes both 
in place of use and in purpose of use. 
The Defendant here was confronted with the need for that 
same kind of a change application when it proposed to construct 
each of its reservoirs. Defendant filed its change application, 
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No. a-5317, to change its point of diversion, so that the direct 
flow right under the Hayes Decree could be diverted into storage. 
The use of storage was also involved under defendant's Applica-
tion to Appropriate 11155, and Change Application a-2829 for the 
North Creek Reservoir. Had there been any lower users from the 
Escalante River, those users would have been able to invoke the 
same principle as that applied in the three storage cases on 
which Plaintiff Estate relies. The change applications to store 
Escalante River water in North Creek Reservoir and Wide Hollow 
Reservoir were approved long ago (see Finding of Fact No. 16, R. 
327, and Exs. 108, 109, 110 & 111), and are not before us in this 
case. 
POINT VII.TWO OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS COVERING TEN ACRES 
OF LAND ARE BASED ON ADVERSE USE, AND RIGHTS 
CANNOT BE ACQUIRED IN DEFENDANT'S WASTE WATER BY 
ADVERSE USE. 
Plaintiff Estate's Water User Claims Nos. 1272 and 1440 are 
based on adverse use (see page 207 of the Proposed Determina-
tion) . Collectively, they are for ten acres of land. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a downstream 
user cannot establish a right under the doctrine of adverse use 
to water which an upstream user permits to flow off his land. 
The matter is addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Smithfield 
West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Canal Co., supra. The 
discussion appears in Utah Reports, Vol. 105, at pages 471-3. 
The court there said: 
As to (a) the excess flow; the owner of a water right, after 
diversion from the stream is the owner and entitled to 
possession of the water itself, the corpus of the water as 
long as he retains it in his ditches or reservoirs, on his 
property or under his control. (citing cases) Once the 
25 
water has passed beyond these conditions it is no longer the 
water or property of the prior user or appropriator. Under 
such conditions an appropriator cannot complain of the use 
of water by another below his point of diversion or place of 
use. (citing cases) And for this reason a lower appropria-
tor or user cannot adverse the upper appropriator as to any 
water which the upper user willfully, or knowingly, or 
unavoidably permits to pass his point of diversion or place 
of use. (citing cases) And he can acquire no right under 
which he can prevent the upper user or appropriator to let 
such water continue to flow down to him. . . . (emphasis 
added) 
See also the discussion in the East Bench case, supra; Garns 
v. Rollins, supra, at page 273: Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. 
Lindsay Land & Livstock, 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d. 634 (1943); and 
Weil, supra, at page 52. 
POINT VIII. NO CHANGE APPLICATION WAS REQUIRED TO MOVE 
RENTED OR PURCHASED WATER FROM ONE TRACT CF 
LAND TO ANOTHER TRACT OF LAND UNDER THE 
DEFENDANT IRRIGATION COMPANY'S SYSTEM. 
The matter is discussed in Syrett v. Tropic & East Fork 
Irr. Co. et al., 97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (1939). The Court's 
unanimous opinion was written by Mr. Justice Wolfe. In the 
opening sentence the Court said that the principal question to 
be determined is: 
"Does a stockholder in a mutual irrigation company who 
wishes to change the point at which he receives his water 
from the company's irrigation canal, and use the water to 
irrigate different lands than those which have theretofore 
been irrigated by such water, have to make application to 
the state engineer under the provisions of Section 100-3-3, 
R.S.U. 1933, as amended by Chapter 130, Laws of Utah 1937?" 
(Emphasis added) 
The holding of the Court in answer to that question is 
reflected in Headnote 1 as follows: 
A change of "place of diversion or use" within statute 
requiring approval of state engineer therefor does not take 
place where a stockholder in an irrigation company seeks to 
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change the point of delivery of the water to which he is 
entitled from the company's canal or lateral where no other 
independent appropriators than the irrigation company have 
an interest in the canal or water. 
The Court said that the situation would be entirely differ-
ent if the appellant or the irrigation company desired to go 
somewhere along the Sevier River and change the point at which 
the water is taken from the river. There the rights of other 
independent appropriators from that source would be involved. 
But for the purposes of the statute, an irrigation company stands 
as a single appropriator of all the water to which its stockhold-
ers are entitled and changes in place of use within the company 
system do not require a change application. There is no evidence 
of any transfers outside the Defendant Irrigation Company's 
system. In fact, the pipeline did not extend to all of the lands 
irrigated by the canalsf and the system was contracted (Tr. 47 & 
145) . 
We next note the case of Arnold v. C. & R. Ass'n, 64 Utah 
534, 231 Pac. 622 (1924). In that case the shareholder wanted to 
change the place of diversion from the Huntington River, rather 
than take water from the Huntington Canal. The company was the 
last user on that river system — as the Defendant Irrigation 
Company is the last user on the Escalante River. The Court 
upheld the right of the shareholder to make the change without 
filing a change application. The Court said: 
. . .The case therefore is not one which involves a change 
of the place of diversion by a water user of a stream where 
other users of water from the same stream are or can be 
affected. The defendant always had diverted water from the 
Huntington river since its organization many years ago 
through the Huntington canal, and therefore what was in fact 
accomplished by the transfer of water from the Avery ditch 
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to the Huntington canal was merely to increase the flow 
somewhat through the Huntington canal. Whether the defen-
dant used more or less water to flow through that canal to 
accommodate its members did not, and cannot, constitute a 
change of the place of diversion as contemplated by our 
statute. (64 Utah at 540). (emphasis added) 
Further, Defendant Irrigation Company fully discharges its 
duty when it delivers the correct amount of water to each share-
holder. At that point it becomes his water and the user — not 
the company — is responsible for its use. The company has no 
duty to police that use. That is for the State Engineer. The 
trial court so held (R. 336) . 
POINT IX. IT IS NOT NECESSARY UNDER UTAH LAW, OR THE LAW 
ANYWHERE IN THE WEST, FOR A WATER USER TO FILE A 
CHANGE APPLICATION TO CHANGE FROM FLOOD TYPE 
IRRIGATION TO A SPRINKLER SYSTEM. 
The first change application legislation was enacted in 1903 
as a part of the original water code. The statute has been 
amended from time to time, but throughout all of the times 
material to this action a change application has been required 
under only three specified conditions: (1) Where there is a 
change in point of diversion from the natural water course; (2) 
where there is a change in place of use; and (3) where there is a 
change in purpose of use. 
In 1983, when the change was made by Defendant Irrigation 
Company to a sprinkler system, the change application statute 
then in effect in material part provided: 
Any person entitled to the use of water may change the place 
of diversion or use and may use the water for other purposes 
than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no 
such change shall be made if it impairs any vested right 
without just compensation. (See Sec. 73-3-3, Utah Code 
Anno. 1953) 
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The statute was amended in 1987, but that amendment does not 
change the above. It now reads (Sec. 73-3-3(2)): 
(a) Any person entitled to the use of water may make: (i) 
permanent or temporary changes in the place of diversion; 
(ii) permanent or temporary changes in the place of use; and 
(iii) permanent or temporary changes in the purpose of use 
for which the water was originally appropriated. 
(b) No change may be made if it impairs any vested right 
without just compensation. 
Plaintiff cites no case in Utah, or elsewhere, holding that 
a change application is necessary to change an irrigation prac-
tice from flood type irrigation to a sprinkling system. We 
cannot find one. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact 
that the application of water by a sprinkler system is a widely 
used practice in the State and throughout the West. The fact 
that there have been no cases requiring a change application is 
significant. 
The administrative interpretation of a statute by the 
administrative agency charged with administering the statute is 
entitled to significant weight. This Court has held that courts 
can take judicial notice of the records of the State Engineer, 
even though not introduced in evidence. See Lehi Irr. Co. v. 
Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P.2d 892 (1949); and McGarry v. Thomp-
son, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948). We refer the court to 
Exhibit A which was attached to our Post-Trial brief (R. 271) , 
which is a copy of the change application form in current use by 
the State Engineer's office. Under paragraph 11, the blank form 
calls for information regarding the "purpose and extent of use" 
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and the purposes are listed as irrigation, stock watering, 
domestic, municipal, mining, power and other. 
We also attached as Exhibit B a copy of the instructions in 
current use in the State Engineerfs office regarding the informa-
tion required by paragraph 11 of the change application blank, 
specifying the purpose and extent of use and the same uses are 
again enumerated (R. 274) . We submit that irrigation is the 
"purpose" of use and that the "purpose" is not changed when an 
irrigator changes to a sprinkling system. 
POINT X. THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
FINDING NO. 28. 
Finding 28 relates to the damage issue and the determination 
by the trial court that Defendant Irrigation Company has no duty 
to the Plaintiff Estate to maintain the historic flow to Alvey 
Wash renders this issue moot. Nevertheless, the evidence does 
support it. 
In Finding No. 28 the trial court found that in 1983 there 
was adequate water; in 1984 the total amount of water available 
was 582.7 acre-feet and that at least 364.9 acre-feet were 
delivered to the Plaintiff Estate; in 1985 the total water 
available was 472.6 acre-feet and the total water delivered to 
the Plaintiff was 199.5 acre-feet; in 1986 the total water 
available was not measured, but the water delivered to the 
Plaintiff was at least 200.3 acre-feet; in 1987 the total amount 
of water available and the amount delivered to Plaintiff was 
162.2 acre-feet. Plaintiff says that the evidence does not 
support that Finding. 
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Specifically, McKay Bailey testified (Tr. 528) that there 
was plenty of water in 1983. Mr. Steed agreed (Tr. 127). At 
page 13 of Plaintiff Estate's brief it sets forth an exhibit 
showing that there were 582.7 acre-feet available in 1984 and 
472.6 acre-feet in 1985. Plaintiff's Exhibit, which we believe 
is No. 63, shows 346.9 acre-feet delivered to Plaintiff in 1984 
and 199.5 in 1985. The same exhibit shows no records for all of 
Alvey Wash in 1986, but Mr. Scott Steed testified (Tr. 77) that 
he had kept a record on his diversions. His readings were 
introduced in evidence as Exhibit 8, and in the upper right hand 
corner of that five-page long-hand exhibit, the total acre-feet 
figure is 200.3. The same exhibit shows 162.2 for 1987. 
POINT XI. RESPONDENT'S REPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
Counsel for Defendant Irrigation Company, in his opening 
statement, acknowledged that there is run-off to Alvey Wash from 
the irrigation by the Defendant's shareholders — the issue was 
the amount (Tr. 376) . Plaintiff Estate, throughout its brief, 
pleads for equity, asserting that the Defendant has excess water 
and should share it, and that the sprinkler-induced shortage has 
been severe. We do not agree. 
At the time of the trial the sprinkler system had been in 
use for five seasons from 1983 to 1988. As the Court found 
(Finding No. 5, R. 324), the rights of the parties are being 
administered on a four-acre-foot duty. Plaintiff Estate would 
thus have been entitled to 200 acre-feet for its 50-acre 
appropriative right and for its adverse right for 10 additional 
acres (40 acre-feet). We will address the Plaintiff's answer on 
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adverse use rights below. There was adequate water in 1983 and 
1984 (Tr. 528) , and Mr. Steed testified that during those years 
users did not need to go on turns (Tr. 127) . As noted next 
above, Plaintiff received 364.9 acre-feet in 1983 and 346.9 in 
1984. There is nothing legally wrong with such diversions, 
because there are no downstream users (Tr. 134) . Excess 
diversions, if unappropriated water exists, is permissible. See 
Adams v. Portage Irr. Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 
648 (1938) But Plaintiff did have water in excess of its rights 
in 1983 and 1984, and the sprinkler system was in use both years. 
There was less water available in 1985, 1986 and 1987. Even so, 
as found by the Court, and as discussed above, Plaintiff got the 
200 acre-feet (199.5 in 1985) under its appropriative right 
except in 1987. 
Plaintiff blames Defendant for all its shortages, but Mr. 
Dale Wilson testified that he and his family owned and operated 
what is now the Steed Estate property for about 15 years, 
starting in the 1950s, and that these were dry years when the 
available water was marginal. They were short of water in the 
latter part of the season (Tr. 172) . Mr. Steed testified that 
the Alvey Wash users upstream from the Plaintiff's land all 
converted to sprinkler systems (Tr. 160) . They all maintained 
dams clear across the stream channel and took all of the water at 
their points of diversion (Tr. 74) , and although the Plaintiff 
claimed the first priority on Alvey Wash, the junior 
appropriators, as shown by the river commissioner reports, were 
diverting water throughout nearly all this period. Mr. Steed, 
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for Plaintiff, acquired 67J shares and moved the water from the 
bench where Plaintiff would get the return flow to his Alvey Wash 
land to the wash, where return flow is to the wash below him (Tr. 
144) . 
Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to the water under 
conditions as they existed when Plaintiff's 1909 application was 
filed. At that time the defendant had no storage reservoirs. 
The construction of those reservoirs permitted the storage of the 
river water during the non-irrigation season and storage of the 
excess flows during the high spring run-off, thereby making it 
possible for Defendant to place more water on its lands. This 
obviously would increase run-off to Alvey Wash. 
Plaintiff complains at acreage enlargement by Defendant. As 
noted above, the Defendant had a legal right to do so, because it 
had perfected new appropriations. By the same token, Plaintiff 
also expanded its Alvey Wash acreage from 60 acres under its 
appropriated and adverse use rights to 148 acres during the same 
period. Plaintiff also made new appropriations of water from 
wells (Tr. 34 & 483) . Plaintiff did not like to use the wells, 
because they were expensive (Tr. 130) , and of poor quality 
(Tr. 356). Mr. Steed testified that prior to 1983 he watered 80 
acres with Alvey Wash and well water. He also purchased and 
rented stock in Defendant Irrigation Company (Tr. 144). So what! 
If one acquires new rights, acreage can be enlarged. 
At the time of the trial on June 15, 1989, which normally 
would be a high water period, the system was shut off dry and the 
Town of Escalante was rationing water (Tr. 158 & 522) . But the 
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Plaintiff wants a replacement order which will give Plaintiff the 
benefit of the Defendant's reservoirs, and thus provide Plaintiff 
with late season water. Plaintiff wants the water delivered to 
Alvey Wash through the $2 million pipeline system, rather than by 
way of return flow. It wants to promote a 1909 appropriative 
right for Defendant's waste water, accumulating as part of the 
erratic flow of Alvey Wash, for a firm right to Escalante River 
water under the Defendant's 18 75 priority. In fact, what he 
seeks would put him ahead of the Defendant. 
Plaintiff complains because change applications were not 
filed when water was sold, or rented, or moved to different 
tracts within the system. Yet plaintiff did the very same thing 
with water under water stock that it rented and purchased (Tr. 
144). However, where the trial court held that the Plaintiff did 
not, by its appropriated right, or by adverse use, obtain the 
right to require the Defendant to continue the same level of 
run-off to Alvey Wash, the Court declined to make specific 
findings on the amount of the waste water which had historically 
found it way to the Plaintiff's point of diversion by way of 
run-off, (however, it varied year by year) nor as to the extent 
of the diminution. It did make Finding No. 28, indicating the 
amount of water the Defendant had had available during the five 
years the sprinkler system had been in use. 
Plaintiff claimed the first priority on water from Alvey 
Wash (see page 6 of Plaintiff's brief and Finding No. 19, R. 
330), but the commissioner reports show that the others continued 
to use that water. Mr. Steed testified that each kept an earthen 
34 
dam across the stream channel above Steed (Tr. 138) . 
Historically, all of the users in this area were short of water. 
While Defendant has a 40 c.f.s. right in the Escalante River, the 
river normally drops way below that (Tr. 521 & 530) . We have 
already noted the testimony of Dale Wilson, the prior owner of 
the Steed Estate land, who said the water supply was marginal 
during his fifteen years of operation. Mr. Steed admitted that 
Defendant Irrigation Company was short of water (Tr. 128). 
Defendant, therefore, expended the money to build two reservoirs 
and spent $2 million for a sprinkler system which would more 
efficiently apply the available water to the land. If the 
Defendant had had plenty of water, it would not have expended 
money for either the reservoirs or the pipeline. 
Plaintiff's answer to our assertion that it could not 
adverse the Defendant is that the Proposed Determination 
recognized those two rights. However, it does not say that the 
adverse use ran against the Defendant. One cannot obtain the 
right to use the unappropriated water by adverse use, or by long 
usage. This Court squarely so held in Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 
517, 189 P. 701 (1948); it is doctrine which applies to already 
perfected rights. See Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634 (1943). 
If one user acquires part of another user's right by adverse 
use, the person adversed would lose part of his right. The 
Proposed Determination does not so decrease any of Defendant's 
rights. There is absolutely no authority anywhere in the West to 
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the effect that adverse use will run against waste water flowing 
from irrigated land, and Plaintiff cites none. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Court's often cited discussion from Hutchins, supra, 
the title of that section is: 
"Waste Water May Be Appropriated Before it Has Returned to 
the Stream From Which Originally Diverted, Within 
Limitations, but as a General Rule the Original User is 
Under No Obligation to Continue the Waste11, (page 362) 
The law is settled to this effect in this jurisdiction — 
and has been settled for 78 years. 
Plaintiff has no water rights in the Escalante River. 
Plaintiff has no interest in the Defendant's appropriations from 
the Escalante River. Plaintiff does not help Defendant maintain 
its diversion dam. Plaintiff has no interest in the Defendant's 
canal, or pipeline system. Plaintiff did not help pay for the 
two storage reservoirs, nor the $2 million sprinkler system. 
Plaintiff is trying to "boot strap" its appropriations from Alvey 
Wash, which is erratic in its flows and has customarily been 
short of water, into a priority equal to, or superior to, the 
Defendant's appropriations in the Escalante River. The law, as 
applied in Utah, is widely followed throughout the West. It is a 
fundamental rule defining property rights. If the rule were to 
be changed so as to be applied as Plaintiff seeks to apply it, it 
would discourage the efficient use of water. If the rule were 
that 100% of the historic artificial flow must be maintained, 
there would be no incentive for anyone to line canals, or install 
sprinkler systems, and no incentive to more efficiently use 
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water. No one would expend the money needed to increase 
irrigation efficiency (which will always involve the consumption 
of more water) if he could not have the benefit of his 
expenditure. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court was correct, and 
that its judgment should be affirmed. 
Dated this /7 day of May, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Edward W. Clyde, Attorney/for 
Defendant/Respondent New 
Escalante Irrigation Company 
APPENDIX A 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended 
73-3-16. . . .Statement in lieu of proof of appropriation or 
change. . . . 
In those areas in which general determination proceedings 
are pending, or have been concluded, under chapter 4 of Title 73 
of this Code, the state engineer may petition the district court 
for permission to waive the requirements of this section and of 
section 73-3-17 as to proof of appropriation and proof of change 
and as to issuance of certificate of appropriation and 
certificate of change, and to permit each owner of an 
application to file a verified statement to the effect that he 
has completed his appropriation or change and elects to file a 
statement of water users claim in such proposed determination of 
water rights or any supplement thereto in accordance with and 
pursuant to chapter 4 of Title 73, in lieu of proof of 
appropriation or proof of change. 
Form in APPENDIX B (Part of Exhibit 
25M 4-<53 1 1 0 ) 
IN THE .... sixrc JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF WAYNE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION \ STATEMENT OF WATER 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE ) USERS CLAIM 
AND/JNDJSRGkOUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE f CODE NO SERIAL NO 
COL6RADO RIVER IN UTAH, EXCLUDING THE GREEN RIVER ( 9 7 3 0 
DRAINAGE AND THE VIRGIN RIVER DRAINAGF AREA. \ 
/ M A P NO 6 2 c & 6 2 d 
NOTE This blank is sent to you in accordance with Utah Law The information called for herein will be used in coo 
nection with the adjudication of water rights on the above mentioned drainage area All questions applicable to your claim 
must be answered fully, and one copy of this form must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court at 
, Utah, within sixty (60) days from date of service of the atuched Notice A copy shall be 
filed with the State Engineer, State Capitol, Salt Lake City Failure to file the atuched Sutement of the Water User s 
Claim with the Clerk of the District Court within the time stated will forever bar and estop you from asserting any nght 
to the use of water from said drainage area. 
1 Name of Claimant N e w Escalarite Irrigation Company 
Interest Claimed f u l 1 
2 Address E s c a l a n t e , Utah 84726 
3 Name of particular sffifflgpfftggjjftaS^: stream, 33fclp^ MK&eX2&a&*1h from which water is diverted is 
*•!- Escalante Mver & #2- Wide Hp*lowinT7a.sh in Garfield County 
4 Priority date claimed D e c e m b e r 2 , 1 9 6 9 Date when water was first used 
Date when work on diverting system was first begun Date when diverting system was completed 
Nature of work 
5 Class of Right (Indicate by X) 
(a) Right to surface water initiated by beneficial use before 1903 Claim No 
(b) Right to underground water initiated before 1935 Claim No 
(c) Right decreed by court, cite title of case 
(d) £X Application filed, State Engineer s Office No 3 3 9 4 1 Cert, of App No E l e c t i o n 
(e) Right acquired by adverse use prior to 1939 
6 Nature (Indicate by X) , Amount, and Annual Period of Use (by month & day) 
(a) ?Q? Irrigation Sec Ft from M a r c h Z to O c t o b e r 3 0 (both dates mcl) 
(b) Stockwatenng Sec Ft from to (both dates mcl ) 
(c) Domestic Sec Ft from to (both dates inci) 
(d) Municipal Sec Ft from to (both dates inci) 
(d^sqgeStorage KSXR 2324 ,53 £oW March 2
 to October 30 (both dates mcl) 
7 Direct Flow Appropriation (must be described with reference to U S Government Survey Corner) 
(a) Point of diversion from s^g£3£w£agXii2fl£ stream, wi2$2QD&pa&i2fi 
# 1 - M» 210 f t . and E. 8Q0 f t * frcrax the Bk c o r , S e c , 10* T35S*. £ 2 $ , sum. 
£ 2 - S - 605 i t . and. W* 275 fJt* frcna the l\k c o r . S e c . 1 2 # T35S* E2E, SLB&*« 
(b) Description of spring area 
(c) Point of rediversion or point of return to natural channel 
(d) If flow is intermittently diverted, list by number or description, all rights involved 
8 Where water is used for irrigation purposes 
(a) Area irrigated in legal subdivisions of land by 40-acre tract (All sources of water for same land or lands must 
be described in each instance by name or claim number) 
SHE ATTACHED SHEETS. 
(b) Do you get water under a ditch owned by several users If so, give names of all users and 
divisions of interest 
9 Where water is used for Stockwatenng 
(a) Number of each kind of stock watered 
(b) All sources of water for same stock (Describe by name or claim number) 
10 Where water is used for Domestic 
(a) Number of families or their equivalent 
11 Where water is used for Municipal Purposes 
(a ) Name of city or town supplied 
Number of families 
12 Where water is used for a purpose not above enumerated 
(a) Nature of Use 
Population 
Quantity of water 
Extent of Use 
Appropriation for Storage Purposes 
(a) Name of reservoir W i d e Hollow Heservoir^ 
(b) Location of reservoir by legal subdivisions described by 40 acre tract* S W $ , S U ^ S E ^ S e c . 1 , E ^ S E „ , 
Sec. 2, NE%NE% Sec. 1 1 , I^ NV X, NW^NEi Sec. 12, T35S, R2E, SIMM. 
( c ) Maximum capacity of reservoir in acre feet * Year construction commenced 
Completed Water first used
 4 . Is reservoir located on or off stream 
( d ) Period of Storage from M a r c h 2
 t o °
C t
* **0 (both date? i n c l ) Period of use from ****—} * 
}
 * '
 J
 Max depth in feet 
Maximum number of fillings per 
If feeder canal is used, give maximum 
Max width 
(both dates incl ) Maximum area in acres inundated 
Average depth in feet Is reservoir drained each year ^ ^ 
year 1$ reservoir used for equalizing purposes 
carrying capacity in sec ft 
Diverting Works 
( a ) Surface water diverting dam Material composed of 
Max length Max height Max width at bottom 
at top 
(b ) Underground water diverting works Is well flowing or pump Depth of well 
Diameter of well Length of drain Width of dram Depth of dram 
Diameter of dram Length of tunnel Width of tunnel Height of tunnel 
Type of pump Capacity of pump 
(c) Surface and underground water conveying works Length of ditch to first place of use Width of 
ditch at top Width of ditch at bottom Depth of water Grade of 
ditch per 1000 ft Material through which ditch passes Maximum length of 
pipe line to first place of use Diameter of pipe line Grade of pipe line per 
1000 feet 
The undersigned hereby enters his appearance and waives service of summons or other process 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
SS (To be used if claimant is an individual) 
being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is the claimant 
whose name appears hereon, that he has read the foregoing statement of his claim and knows the contents thereof, that 
he has signed the same, and that the answers set forth therein are true to his best knowledge and belief 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
Signature of Claimant 
19 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
(SS (To be used if claimant is a corporation or an estate) 
STATE OF UTAH 
C O U N T Y OF 5 2 > j k ^ C 4 ^ / ) 
***^LlL*JftiL+ KA+x-JS^-uA, , being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is ihe 
Z^4&<4rC+\J^ If of the above claimant, that he makes this certification on behalf of said 
claimant, that he has read the foregoing statement of claim and knows the contents thereof, and that he has signed the name 
of said claimant to said statement, that the answers set forth thereirr are true toyhis best knowledge and belief 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /* day of , ° 0 ^ - ^ ' 19 ?f 
/.< / /> 
i NOTARY PUBLIC 
Water U s e r ' s Claim 9 7 - 8 8 , New E s c a l a n t e I r r i g a t i o n Company 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 8 8 , 1200 on; 
7 . 8 0 a c s . SE%SE%, S e c . 1 0 , T35S, R2E, SLB&M, 5 . 7 0 a c s , SE%NE%, 5 . 6 0 a c s . NE^SW ;^, 
6 . 9 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 1 4 . 9 0 a c s . SE%SW%, 1 0 . 2 0 a c s . SW%SW% S e c . 1 1 , T35S, R2E, SLB6M; 
0 . 2 0 a c . WfyNW*, 1 3 . 2 0 a c s . SEiNfci, 2 0 . 1 0 a c s . SU%NWi, 2 .30 a c e . KW&>U*;, S e c . 1 2 , 
T35S, R25, SLB&M, or a t o t a l o l 8 6 . 9 0 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1200 on; 
1 5 . 6 0 a c s . W^Mky 7 . 3 0 a c s . NE^iV1-, 1 2 . 7 0 a c s . SE^NE%, 1 2 . 4 0 a c s . SW%NEfc, 
1 0 . 6 0 a c s . SE%NW%, 8 .60 a c s . NE^SE*;, 4 . 2 0 c c s . NW£SE%f S e c . 1 2 , 7 3 5 3 , R2E, SLB&M; 
1 8 . 2 0 a c s . NE-kNE>, 2 0 . 1 0 a c s . NWiNEi, 1 7 . 3 0 a c s . :ffi£NW%, 1U.60 a c s . NW-kNT?:, 
17.CO a c s . SE%NE%, 2 1 . 3 0 a c s . SU<NSv, 1 0 . 7 0 a c s . SL,\^% 1 7 . 1 0 a c s . EWiKfci, 
1 3 . 0 0 a c s . NE^SEt, 1 4 . 8 0 a c s . nfci£Efc, 7 .90 c c s . SE^SWfc, 9 . 3 0 a c s . NWiSW%» 1 0 . 8 6 act 
SE%SE£ S e c . 7 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 2 . 0 0 a c s . NW%NWif 1 2 . 5 0 a c s . NW£SW%, 6 . 3 0 a c s . 
SEiSE%, 1 0 . 0 6 a c s . SW%SE%, 2 2 . 0 7 a c s . SE\fiUk$ 1 9 . 0 4 a c s . SW^SWi, S e c . 8 , T35S, 
R3E, SLB&M; 0 . 6 0 a c . SW%SW% S e c . 9 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 6 . 0 0 a c s . NWiNwi, 0 . 2 0 a c . 
SW%NW%, 1 . 6 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 1 9 . 2 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 1 7 . 3 0 a c s . SE^SW%, 3 4 . 5 0 acs ' . SW%SW% 
S e c . 1 6 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . NS$NE%, 2 0 . 4 0 a c s . INU-VJNEV, 1 3 . 3 5 a c s . NEtfflrt 
1 7 . 3 8 a c s . HW%HWi, 2 . 7 0 a c s . SS^N2%, 1 0 . 7 8 a c s . SW^NEi, 2 3 . 2 1 a c s . SE£NW%, 2 1 . 7 4 ac 
SW%HW%f 3 1 . 6 0 a c s . NS?£E%, 3 9 . 1 0 a c s . InCiSE-V, 3 6 . 5 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 3 8 . 9 0 acs.'NW^SWi, 
1 2 . 9 0 a c s . SE%SE£, 1 9 . 1 0 a c s . SW%SE%, 1 0 . 1 0 a c s . SE%SW%, 3 . 9 0 a c s . SW*SW% S e c . 1 7 , 
T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 3 . 5 0 a c s . NE%NE%, 4 . 3 9 a c s . SE%NE%, 2 9 . 9 0 a c s . NE%SE%, 1 1 . 1 0 
a c s . SEiSE%, 1 2 . 0 0 a c s . SU^SE-VScc. 1 8 , T35S, R3E, SL36&; 2 5 . 2 0 a c s . NE%NE%, 
4 1 . 3 0 a c s . NW^NE%, 3 2 . 6 0 a c s . NE%NW%, 3 9 . 2 0 a c s . SE%NE%, 2 6 . 8 0 a c s . SW%NE%, 
2 9 . 6 0 a c s . SE-iNUi, 1 .00 a c s . SW%HWif 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . NE^SEi, 3 5 . 8 0 a c s . NW^SE%, 
3 5 . 0 0 a c s . NE?£W£t 5 . 6 0 a c s . NlJ-iSWl;, 2 7 . 6 0 a c s . SE%SS%, 3 4 . 2 0 a c s . STvVSEi, 
2 6 . 3 0 a c s . SE-iSW£f 1 . 2 0 a c s . SWiSWfe S e c . 2 0 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 2 2 . 5 0 a c s . NE*NW£, 
1 1 . 8 0 a c s . NW&JVJ^ , 1 2 . 3 0 a c s . SW#JW%, 4 . 0 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 3 6 . 3 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 1 3 . 7 0 
a c s . SW^SE%, 2 5 . 6 0 a c s . SE*SW%, 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . SW*SW% S e c . 2 1 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 
5 . 5 0 a c s . SWjJSW*;, S e c . 2 7 , T35S, R3E, SLEc-M; 2 1 . 0 0 a c s . H ^ E i ; , 3 S . 3 0 a c s . HE#iW%, 
4 0 . 0 0 a c s . NW%NW%, 1 0 . 1 0 a c s . SU&Zk, 1 0 . 0 0 a c s . SE^W£, 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . SW^Wi, S e c . 
2 8 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 1 9 . 6 0 a c s . NE%NE%, 2 9 . 4 0 a c s . NW£NE£, 1 8 . 7 0 a c s . NE^NWi, 
3 5 . 4 0 a c s . SEiNE1-, 2 1 . 4 0 a c s . SW;;:,_^, 5 . 4 0 a c s . SE^ NW%, 2 . 9 0 a c s . NE!;SEtt 3 9 . 0 0 ace 
NW%SE%f 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . SE%SE%, 2 8 . 0 0 a c s . SW%SE% S e c . 2 9 , T35S, R3i£, SLB&M; 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . 
mlMk, 2 3 . 0 0 a c s . NW^NE ,^ 1 0 . 6 0 a c s . SZ#U%t 2 . 8 0 a c s . SW^NE^, S e c . 3 2 , T35S, R3E, 
SLB&M; 3 5 . 1 0 a c s . KE-i»J24, 2 3 . 2 0 a c s . NW^NEi, 4 2 . 0 0 a c s . NE%NW%, 3 8 . 9 0 a c s . NWiNW%, 
1 1 . 6 0 a c s . SW&iE%t 2 0 . 4 0 a c s . SE£NW-it 2 8 . 0 0 a c s . SW%flW%, 1 0 . 5 0 a c s . :1W%SE4, 
3 8 . 9 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 2 3 . 8 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 2 . 1 0 a c s . SW%SEi, 2 9 . 5 0 a c s . SE£SW%, 3 7 . 0 0 
a c s . SW%SW% S e c . 3 3 , T35S, R3E, SL36M; 2 8 . 3 0 a c s . NE^ SW% S e c . 3 4 , T35S, R3E, 
SLB&M; 1 5 . 6 0 a c s . SE?4W%, 1 3 . 6 0 a c s . SW^NW ,^ 1 7 . 2 0 a c s . SE%SW%, 7 . 4 0 a c s . SW S^W%, 
S e c . 3 , T36S, R3fi, SLB&L; 2 4 . 8 0 a c s . NE%NW%, 9 . 5 0 a c s . M-7%IIW%, S e c . 4 , T36S, 
R3E, SBD&M; 1 5 . 6 0 a c s . NE£NW%, 1 2 . 0 0 a c s . NW%NW%, S e c . 1 0 , T36S, R3E, SLB&M, 
or a t o t a l o f 2 » 3 5 2 . 9 8 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 6 , 1 2 , 1 9 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1 2 0 0 , 1 2 5 0 , 1251 on; 
4 . 7 0 a c s . NE^NEi, 2 . 8 0 a c s . SE^fE%, S e c . 7 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 1 2 . 7 0 a c s . NW%KW%, 
9 . 4 0 a c s . SE%NW%, 2 9 . 7 0 a c s . SW N^W%, 2 3 . 0 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 7 . 6 0 a c s . NW}£W%, S e c . 8 , 
T35S, R3E, SLB&M, or a t o t a l o f 8 9 . 9 0 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 5 8 7 , 1200 on; 
3 . 1 0 a c s . NW^ NW% S e c . 8 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M, o r a t o t a l o f 3 . 1 0 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1200 on; 
1 3 . 5 0 a c s . SE%SE%, 3 . 0 0 a c s . SW^SE^, S e c . 2 1 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M, 1 8 . 0 0 a c s . 
NE%NE£, 7 . 5 0 a c s . SE^NE-V, S e c . 2 8 , T35S, R3E, SLES^, o r a t o t a l o f 4 2 . 0 0 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1 2 0 0 , 1226 on; 
1 9 . 1 0 a c s . SE£NS%, S e c . 2 8 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M, or a t o t a l o f 1 9 . 1 0 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1 1 8 0 , 1200 on; 
0 . 4 0 a c . NW?£W%, 1 6 . 8 0 a c s . SE*SW%, 7 .50 a c s . SW%SW%, S e c . 2 7 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M, 
0 . 3 0 a c . IiE^iW?;, S e c . 2G, T35S, R3~, SLB&M, or a t o t a l o f 2 5 . 0 0 a c r e s . 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 3 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 3 3 , 1 2 0 0 , 1272 on; 
3 . 4 0 a c s . NE-iSE%, 1 0 . 7 0 a c s . NW£SE%, 1 6 . 7 0 a c s . SE i SEi , 2 9 . 2 0 a c s . SW?£Ei 
S e c . 3 4 , T35S, R3E, SL3&M, or a t o t a l of 6 0 . 0 a c r e s . 
.2 /Q-/97£_ 
W.U.C. 97-88 NEW SSCALANTE IRRIGATION COMPANY 
Cont'd 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1255 on; 
5.00 acs. SW^SE^ Sec. 8, T35S, R3E# SLB&M, or a total of 5.00 acres. 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1254 on; 
1.00 ac. SW£SE% Sec. 8, T35S, R3E, SLB&M, or a total of 1.00 acre. 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1261 on; 
11.00 acs. SW^NEi, 0.70 ac. NE&Ei, 2.60 acs. IJBfcSEk, Sec. 28, T35S, R3E, SLB&I, 
or a total of 14.30 acres. 
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1261, 1262 on; 
13.00 acs. NE^SE%, Sec. 28, T35S, R3E, SLB&t, or a total of 13.00 acres. 
Total acreage under all categories combined: 2712.28 acres. 
Water User;s Claims 6, 12, 19, 21, 66, 88, 587, 1180, 1200, 1250, 1251, 1254, 1255 
are limited to the irrigation requirements of 2,563.88 acres. 
Page No. 3 
FEES FOR APPLICATIONS TO APPROPRIATE WATER IN UTAH 
^—r-p . Flow rate — c.Ls. Cost 
^\§\\lL{l^ri^0.0 to 0.1 $ 10.00 
^ V J?
 x<& X ^ x e r o-1 t0 °-5 20-00 
^ ' " ' • c f i ^ ^<;N vpyV 0.5 to 1.0 30.00 
• *--• ^ *,0 *" vvS^v% 1-0 ^ 0 15.0 30.00 plus $5 for each cfs above the first cubic foot 
—! ->vU '
 ff^ °m 15.0 100.00 P ^ second. 
--< " ( J ^ % CL^ 
\'/>. ^\<<sy ° t o 20- 15-00 
^ / 7 7 q ^ Y W / o v e r 20 to 500 30.00 
-^—^""^ over 500 to 7500 30.00 plus $5 for each 500 a.f: above the first 500 
over 7500 100.00 acre feet. 
(This section is not to be filled in by applicant) 
STATE ENGINEER'S ENDORSEMENTS 
&MIK. 
'Application received ^ y e ^ ^ t e r m ^ t a t e E n g i n e e r ' s ollke hy.:Z^J... 
2. ^ l . ^ / ' M ^ P r i o r i t y of Application brought down to, on account of...:: ?-/• 
<?««.. a, / t u q Vt-.-~* ^L.S.idzr^ 3^N proo-T n o t L ' ^ v l « ^ VJO\\AW C .^U£. 
Implication examined by 
7 Application returned, 
3^)/^.^>/^.4/...Application fee, .., received by...^2^K2 Rec. No, 
4. ,* t^*. . / rA/ . . .Appl icat^ and indexed by...^. 
5.^2^^Z-/.^/Application platted \yr^^^f^^f-'-
fpi
* -«gg::::::::::::: 
or corrected by office.. 
8. ..Corrected Application resubmitted ^
 ma^ to State Engineer's office. 
9. y^^^../^.//0^^yplication approved for advertisement by>^2 
10. ^#4^«.£.^jf£zNotice to water users prepared by. 
11. £L6^X^/?^2JPublication began: was completed .CLdCUX^J:...Sl. 
Notice published 
12. &^.-Xtyl$&%.'?iQot slips checked by... 
13. / . ...Application protested 
^dkL 
H^Wj7.^./f.^.fcrPub1isher paid by M.E.V. No.^^.^J^ 
15. Q Hearing held by 
16. Field examination by 
17. J.UN.1.9J962 Application designated for ^ i S J ^ ^ ' 
18. .Juns..25.>...19.6?\ppiication copied or photostated by ??.s. proofread by. 
19. JSMJS...?**.Implication Jgg™*1 
20. Conditions: 
This Application is approved, subject to prior rights, as follows: 
a. Actual construction work shall be diligentily prosecuted to completion. 
b. Proof of Appropriation shall be submitted to the State Engineer's office by.?i£.Y.f...3?^..i9.9.k 
c 
. . . . ^ ^ 
Wayne fl. G r i d d l e State Engineer. 
21 Time for making Proof of Appropriation extended lo.^CUs^...3.0.^j9..U.Q-
^:U^:^^x^^^^ML^J^:^ J./-.JO-76 
22. 
23. 
c?.Z/.32Proof of Appropriation submitted. 
Certificate of Appropriation, No , issued 
A T T E . N T I . O N 
THJS FORM IS TO BE USED ONLY WHEN WATER HAS BEEN PLACED TO FULL 
BENEFICIAL USE 
Fortf 152 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELECTION TO FILE WATER USER'S CLAIM 
APPLICATION NO. 1>h°t 4-f fa 7~ gf J 
XR STA^ TE OF UTAH
COUI^TY OF 
jt being first duly sworn. 
say0 that he is the owner of the above application; that the 
development contemplated under this application has been completed 
and the water placed to beneficial use. 
In lieu of submitting "Proof of Appropriation" or 
"Certificate of Change", the applicant hereby elects to file a 
"Statement of Water User's Claim" or an "Amended Statement of 
Wat^r User's Claim" in the pending GENERAL DETERMINATION OF WATER 
RIGHTS; and that the applicant requests that said statement be 
prepared by the State Engineer and submitted for execution at an 
early date. 
V APPLICANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
yp^e^W^ , 19 7^ . 
T&A'C<2£ x^^io^ 
NOTARY PUB^ic / ; • -ir.\y -frf,, f *n C f NOTARY PUBLIC 
37 
I hereby certify that on the /7 day of May, 1990, I caused 
to be mailed copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
Plaintiff/Appellants' attorneys, as follows: L. R. Gardiner, 
Jr., Bullock & Gardiner, 353 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; and Richard Ruckenbrod, American Plaza II, Suite 400, 57 
West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
